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In 1950 Mexico entered an economic takeoff and grew rapidly for more 
than 30 years. Growth stopped during the crises of 1982-1995, despite 
major reforms, including liberalization of foreign trade and investment. 
Since then growth has been modest. We analyze the economic history of 
Mexico 1877-2010. We conclude that the growth 1950-1981 was driven 
by urbanization, industrialization, and education and that Mexico would 
have grown even more rapidly if trade and investment had been liberalized 
sooner. If Mexico is to resume rapid growth—so that it can approach U.S. 
levels of income—it needs further reforms.
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1.  introduction
In 1950 Mexico seemed posed for what Rostow (1960) later termed an 
economic takeoff: following the worldwide Great Depression of the late 
1920s and early 1930s, Mexico had begun to grow steadily. Workers 
were flowing into cities, manufacturing was increasing as a fraction of 
gross domestic product (GDP) as agriculture declined, and education 
was spreading throughout the country. Indeed, a spectacular takeoff 
occurred: Between 1950 and 1981, real GDP in Mexico grew by 6.5 
percent per year. Despite a high rate of population growth, real GDP 
per working-age (15-64 years) person grew by 3.6 percent per year. 
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grew by only 1.3 percent per year, and real GDP per working-age 
person fell by 1.6 percent per year. Starting in 1995, economic growth 
resumed, but it was modest: Between 1995 and 2007, real GDP grew 
by 3.7 percent per year and real GDP per working-age person grew by 
1.7 percent per year. Mexico fared badly during the 2007-2009 Great 
Recession, but economic growth resumed in 2010. 
Figure 1 presents data on real GDP per working-age person in Mexico 
during 1875-2010 (except for 1910-1920 during the Revolución).1 In 
this paper, we contrast Mexico’s growth experience with that in the 
United States, presented in Figure 2. Notice how close the U.S. data 
are to a constant growth path with 2 percent growth per year. There 
are small business cycle fluctuations around the constant growth 
path, and there is the major deviation during the Great Depression 
of 1929-1939 and the subsequent World War II buildup. The United 
States has been the industrial leader, the richest major country in the 
world, since the early 20th century, when it took over this role from 
the United Kingdom. We argue that the United States was able to 
achieve its steady growth by adopting new technologies.
Figure 1. real Gdp per working-age person in Mexico
1.  Throughout this paper, we use the historical data on GDP in constant 1970 prices published by 
Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática (INEGI) (2009). (The data are updated for 
2009 and 2010 with data from International Financial Statistics 2011.) We also analyze movements in 
GDP per working-age person, rather than GDP per capita, whenever possible because it is a better 
measure of an economy’s ability to produce goods and services, especially in the context of the theory 
presented in Sections 4 and 5. The use of the INEGI data set accounts for the minor differences in 
growth rates reported here and those in Kehoe and Ruhl (2010, 2011). Details on the data are available 
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Figure 2. real Gdp per working-age person  
in the united States
 
To analyze the Mexican economic history corresponding to the data 
in Figure 1, we follow a theoretical framework proposed by Kehoe and 
Ruhl (2010), who in turn follow Parente and Prescott (1994, 2002) 
and Kehoe and Prescott (2002, 2007). In this theory, a growing stock 
of technologies may be adopted at some cost. As countries implement 
these technologies, output grows. In the United States, continual 
adoption of improved technology generated a near-constant growth rate 
over the period 1875-2010, as seen in Figure 2. Technology adoption 
gives rise to trend growth rates in the adopting countries close to 2 
percent per year after capital and labor have had time to adjust. The 
absolute level of a particular country compared with the industrial 
leader depends on its institutions and economic policies. An economy 
that is far from the frontier can grow rapidly even with inefficient 
institutions and policies. 
Mexico grew more rapidly than the United States during two significant 
periods: the Porfiriato of 1877-1910—when its government encouraged 
foreign investment and developed the railway system—and during 
1950-1981—when the government implemented policies that promoted 
urbanization, industrialization, and education. The crises and stagnation 
of 1982-1995 were results both of the fiscal imbalances of 1970-1981 
and of a deterioration in policies and institutions. We hypothesize 
that, by 1995, Mexico had arrived at the balanced-growth path that 
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If Mexico is to grow rapidly—so that it can resume catching up to the 
United States—it needs to reform. We identify the problems in the 
Mexican economy at which reforms could be targeted: (1) inefficiency of 
the financial system, (2) lack of contract enforcement, (3) inflexibility 
in the labor market, and (4) monopolies in nonmanufacturing sectors 
like electricity, telecommunications, transportation, and petroleum 
extraction. The Mexican economy would also reap benefits from 
reducing violence related to drug trafficking.
We compare the experience of Mexico with that of China, another 
large, less-developed country. As did Mexico in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, China opened itself to foreign trade and investment in the late 
1990s and early 2000s. China’s growth rate has been far higher than 
that of Mexico, however, even though China suffers from many of the 
same inefficiencies as Mexico. In terms of our theory, the difference can 
be explained by the fact that China is still much poorer than Mexico 
and is reaping the benefits of its policies that promote urbanization, 
industrialization, and education, as did Mexico during 1950-1981. As 
China develops, problems like inefficiency in the financial system, lack 
of contract enforcement, and rigid labor markets will slow down growth 
there. The comparison with China is useful for thinking about the 
Mexican experience in that it provides evidence that, if liberalization 
of foreign trade and investment had accompanied the policies that 
promoted urbanization, industrialization, and education in 1950-1981, 
Mexico would have grown even more rapidly.
The analysis of this paper suggests a number of directions for future 
research. One direction would be to modify the one-sector growth 
model that we use in this paper to incorporate multiple sectors and 
to formalize Rostow’s (1960) concept of stages of growth. Another, 
related, direction would be to use an open economy model to quantify 
the costs and benefits of import substitution during Mexico’s rapid 
growth of 1950-1981.
2.  economic history up until 1950
Mexico’s economic history from Independence in 1810 until the first 
inauguration of Porfirio Díaz as president in 1877 did not involve 
much economic growth. The period 1810-1877 was one of political 
instability. Between 1833 and 1855, for example, Antonio López de 
Santa Anna was president during 11 nonconsecutive periods. Mexico 
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1848 and by France in 1862-1867. Real GDP per capita fell during 
the period 1810-1877 by a cumulative 10.5 percent.
We date the modern economic history of Mexico as beginning in 1877, 
with the first inauguration of Porfirio Díaz. We divide 1877-2010 into 
the periods in Figure 3. In this section, we examine economic events 
that took place during 1877-1950, which set the stage for the takeoff 
experienced by the Mexican economy starting in 1950. Our principal 
source is Solís (2000). 
Figure 3. Mexican economic history, 1877-2010
2.1.  1877-1910: Porfiriato
Porfirio Díaz was president of Mexico during 1877-1880 and 1884-
1911. The Revolución, the Mexican civil war that started in 1910, 
grew out of widespread social discontent with the Díaz regime. At the 
beginning of the Porfiriato, the economic geography of Mexico could 
be described as a collection of small economic units that functioned 
in an autarkic way, producing goods for self-consumption. The most 
important economic feature of the Porfiriato was the construction 
of railroads. Mexico became a nationwide market economy as the 
possibilities of exchange grew. In parallel, there were major investments 
in ports, telegraph, telephone, and electricity. The government played 
an important role in promoting foreign investment in railroads. The 
government granted concessions and paid subsidies per kilometer of 
railway built. The principal source of funds for the construction of 
the railways was American investors. 232 LATIN AMERICAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | Vol. 48 No. 2 (Nov., 2011), 227–268
When Díaz came to power in 1877 Mexico had 640 km of railways. 
During his first term as president, railways grew to a total of 1,074 
km. Between 1880 and 1884, railways grew to a total of 5,731 
km. As a result, Mexico had railways going from Mexico City to 
Veracruz, the main port in the Gulf of Mexico, and to the border 
with the United States. Railways went from 5,731 km to 19,748 km 
from 1884 to 1910. The expansion of railways had many effects on 
the Mexican economy. Exporting firms (raw materials from mining 
being the principal Mexican export) saw their costs reduced. Internal 
migration of workers, as a function of regional differences in wages, 
grew. New mining projects were undertaken, as the fall in transport 
costs made them profitable. 
Economic growth in Mexico during the Porfiriato was impressive for 
that time: real GDP per capita grew by 2.1 percent per year during 
1877-1910. According to Rostow (1960), modern economic growth started 
in the United Kingdom in the early 19th century, and, according to 
Maddison (1995), in the United Kingdom the average growth of real 
GDP per capita 1820-1900 was 1.2 percent per year. Between 1875 and 
1910, real GDP per capita in the United States grew by 2.0 percent per 
year, as the United States overtook and passed the United Kingdom, 
whose growth rate during this period was only 0.9 percent per year, 
to become the world’s industrial leader. During this period, Mexico, 
whose growth rate was 2.1 percent per year, grew even faster. As the 
data in Figure 4 illustrate, the Porfiriato was the period—except 
for the 1950-1981 import substitution period—in which Mexico was 
Figure 4. real Gdp per working-age person in Mexico  
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catching up to the United States.2 We interpret the economic events of 
the Porfiriato as the beginning of an economic takeoff that was aborted 
by the events of the Revolución and the worldwide Great Depression 
that followed shortly after.
2.2.  1910-1928: Revolución and reconstruction
The Revolución, or civil war, that started in Mexico in 1910 as Francisco 
I. Madero led an uprising against Porfirio Díaz, resulted in a large fall 
in the population and a large destruction of the capital stock. The 
population of Mexico fell from 15.2 million to 14.3 million between 
1910 and 1921, the period during which most of the armed conflict 
took place. Besides the reduction in population caused directly by 
the war, there was a large migration to the United States. According 
to Solís (2000), between 1910 and 1930, 600,000 Mexicans migrated. 
Another factor behind the fall in population was the flu epidemic 
1918-1919. The migration to the United States and the flu epidemic 
must have disproportionately affected people with low education levels. 
According to census data, the number of people who knew how to 
read and write rose from 3.0 million in 1910 to 3.6 million in 1921, 
even as the overall population fell.
Álvaro Obregón, president from 1920 to 1924, oversaw the beginning of 
the reconstruction of Mexico after the end of the armed conflict. There 
was an increase in investment in public education. At the same time, 
however, the economic situation was characterized by high uncertainty. 
For example, Obregón was not initially recognized as president by the 
United States. Plutarco E. Calles, president from 1924 to 1928—and 
one of the most important figures in Mexican politics between 1924 and 
1936—created institutions that contributed to economic development. 
In 1925, he created the Comisión Nacional de Caminos, which had 
the objective of expanding Mexico’s road system. In the same year, 
Calles created the Banco de México, Mexico’s central bank. Also in 
1925, Calles created the Comisión Nacional de Irrigación, which was 
responsible for carrying on large hydraulic projects for irrigation for 
the agricultural sector. 
2.  The data in Figure 4 differ from those in Figures 1 and 2 and those used in the rest of the paper 
except in Figure 18. They are purchasing power parity real GDP numbers taken from Maddison (2010) 
and the World Bank World Development Indicators (2011).234 LATIN AMERICAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | Vol. 48 No. 2 (Nov., 2011), 227–268
Growth was lower in this period than during the Porfiriato, as is to 
be expected. Real GDP per working-age person grew at 0.4 percent 
per year. One important change with respect to the Porfiriato is that 
the 1917 Constitution established the national interest in Mexico´s 
natural resources. The 1938 nationalization of the oil industry, in 
which there was an important amount of foreign investment, would 
reflect that interest in the coming decades. 
2.3.  1928-1950: Great depression and recovery
The worldwide Great Depression had a large negative impact on 
economic activity in Mexico. In 1934, GDP per working-age person 
reached its lowest value since the end of the 19th century. Between 
1928 and 1932, real GDP per working-age person fell by 7.0 percent 
per year. Exports and imports fell. Given that a large fraction of tax 
revenues came from tariffs on foreign trade, tax revenue fell 25 percent. 
Fiscal expenditures were reduced.
Following the Depression, Mexico started growing again. Important 
institutions were created. In terms of politics, military leaders started 
losing ground to civilian leaders. Industrial workers and farmers were 
incorporated to the political system, through the Partido Revolucionario 
Institucional (PRI), which governed Mexico until the end of the 20th 
century. Four important events took place in the interwar period: the 
nationalization of the oil industry, the development of the financial 
system, expenditure on public investment, and the agrarian reform.
The nationalization of the oil industry in 1938 had as a major 
consequence import substitution, as products that were previously 
imported were now produced domestically. According to Solís (2000), 
in broader terms, the management of the oil industry was now aimed 
at contributing to the development of the economy.
The financial system recovered after the contraction suffered during 
the Revolución. Bank assets were one-third of GDP in 1910. In 1925, 
they were one-fifth. Bank assets recovered their pre-Revolución level in 
1940. Banking credit also fell during this period. During the Revolución 
there was an increase in currency in circulation and in inflation. It is 
important to note that one of the main characteristics of the Banco de 
México was that it was granted the monopoly over currency emission. 
Before this event, private banks could print money. Inflation during 
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the country, and in Veracruz and Tampico. Coins with gold or silver 
content that had been hoarded started being used in transactions. 
After the creation of the Banco de México there was an increase in 
checking accounts between 1925 and 1930. The Great Depression 
brought a fall in the price level and in the money supply defined as 
medios de pago (M1). This happened until 1935, when both variables 
started growing again. Between 1929 and 1934, the GDP deflator fell 
at an average rate of 2.5 percent per year. The money supply as a 
percentage of GDP fell at an average rate of 3.5 per year. 
The composition of government expenditure shifted during 1934-1952. 
During the administration of Lázaro Cárdenas (president during 1934-
1940), expenditures on irrigation, credit to the agricultural sector, 
communications, and public works increased from 20-25 percent to 
37-40 percent of the public budget. Presidents Ávila Camacho and 
Alemán maintained this trend. By 1952, these sorts of expenditures 
represented 46.9 percent of the budget. Additionally, during the 
Cárdenas administration, expenditures on education, public health, 
water provision, and sewage increased, reaching 19.9 percent of the 
budget, a maximum until 1962.
The Reforma Agraria was aimed at distributing land to peasants. This 
was one of the principal demands of peasants during the Revolución. 
The Obregón and Calles administrations had started distributing land 
through institutional channels. During the Cárdenas administration, 
this process accelerated. Cárdenas distributed 18.8 million hectares. 
Both President Ávila Camacho and President Alemán carried on this 
policy, at a slower pace, distributing 7.3 and 4.6 million hectares, 
respectively. During the Great Depression there was a fall in output 
in the agricultural sector. According to Solís (2000), during the period 
1929-1950, real GDP (at 1960 pesos) in the agricultural sector grew 
at an average rate of 3.9 percent per year, which is almost the same 
growth of total GDP, which was 4.0 percent per year.
Over the entire 1928-1950 period, real GDP per working-age person 
grew at 1.3 percent per year. This is the combination of the fall of 7.0 
percent per year 1928-1932 with a recovery at a rate of 3.7 percent 
per year 1932-1950. The data in Figure 4 show that the recovery in 
Mexico was not as vigorous as that in the United States, however. 
According to Solís (2000), during the period 1929-1950 average yearly 
inflation, measured with the GDP deflator, was relatively high, at 6.5 
percent per year. It was 9.5 percent per year between 1934 and 1950. 236 LATIN AMERICAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | Vol. 48 No. 2 (Nov., 2011), 227–268
3.  economic history since 1950
In terms of Rostow’s (1960) stages of economic growth, we can think 
of Mexico as starting a takeoff during the Porfiriato, only to have it 
aborted by the events connected with the Revolución and the Great 
Depression. The recovery following the Great Depression set the stage 
for the takeoff that occurred in the three decades after 1950. We view 
the takeoff as the product of urbanization and industrialization and 
the increase in education levels, as well as the adoption of advanced 
technologies from abroad, principally the United States. Our sources 
are Cárdenas (1996) and Solís (2000). In this section, we analyze this 
experience as well as the slowdown that has followed.
3.1.  1950-1970: import substitution  
and catch-up growth
Capital accumulation grew during the 1950s. During the 1950s, total 
investment grew faster than GDP. The government invested in public 
infrastructure: the oil industry, highways, health, and education. In 
terms of the loanable funds for investment emphasized by Rostow 
(1960), it is worth stressing that the private domestic financial system 
was a limited source for such funds. Figure 5 presents data on private 
credit as a fraction of GDP from 1950 to 2010. These numbers are 
very low by comparative international standards. As Bergoeing et al. 
(2002) point out, for example, private credit averaged only 23.1 percent 
of GDP in Mexico over the period 1980-2000 while it averaged 61.1 
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percent in Chile, a country with a similar level of development. More 
developed nations, like the United States, have even higher levels of 
private credit. Nonetheless, the private financial sector grew rapidly 
during the 1950s. Its assets, measured at current prices, were multiplied 
by three, in a period of low inflation.
During this period, the growth of the agricultural sector was related 
to industrialization. Between 1945 and 1952, the agricultural sector 
grew more because of the extensive margin than because of a higher 
yield by hectare. The situation reversed between 1952 and 1956. 
This was due to a larger domestic and external demand, the growth 
of cities, and the process of industrialization. Industries demanded 
goods such as cotton.
After a balance of payments crisis in 1948, the government decided to 
protect the domestic production of consumption goods and imposed 
import quotas. The government also provided fiscal measures to 
foster the reinvestment of profits, and kept and expanded the policy 
of creation of new firms through subsidies, fiscal exemptions, and the 
support of Nacional Financiera, the largest of the government-operated 
development banks.
In 1950, for a large set of goods, there was no import substitution, as 
domestic industries already satisfied 95 percent of the domestic market 
for such products as textiles, food, beverages, and tobacco (classified 
as basic industries), shoes and soap (classified as consumption goods), 
and rubber, alcohol, and glass (classified as intermediate goods). For 
other products, there was a significant amount of import substitution. 
These goods were intermediates, durables, and capital goods. Cárdenas 
(1996) decomposes the sources of growth of industrial demand into 
domestic demand, external demand, import substitution, and structural 
change. Between 1950 and 1954, he finds that import substitution was 
negligible. Between 1954 and 1958 its contribution was 9 percent, a 
contribution smaller than in the 1930s. It is interesting to note that, 
between 1952 and 1958, 38 percent of private investment was destined 
to the purchase of imported machinery and equipment. In this sense, 
there was substantial technology adoption from abroad in that period. 
According to Cárdenas (1996), during the period 1958-1962, the 
contribution of import substitution to the growth of industrial demand 
was 22.3 percent due to a more protectionist trade policy. Over time, 
import substitution became difficult because it had to take place by 
producing intermediate and capital goods. Figure 6 presents data on 
the evolution of foreign trade in Mexico.238 LATIN AMERICAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | Vol. 48 No. 2 (Nov., 2011), 227–268
Figure 6. international trade in Mexico
The increase in GDP took place at the same time as urban growth. 
Figure 7 presents data on urbanization. Here the urban population is 
defined as that living in agglomerations of more than 2,500 inhabitants. 
Similar graphs are obtained for other definitions of urban population, 
but there are more data for this definition. There was also a reduction 
in the size of the agricultural sector and of mining. Figure 8 presents 
data on the sectoral composition of GDP. Migration from rural to urban 
areas was due to a lack of opportunities in the agricultural sector. The 
capital-labor ratio grew 7 percent on average during this period, which 
increased real wages. Gross fixed capital formation grew at 10.3 percent 
between 1963 and 1970, increasing the investment to GDP ratio to 18.5 
percent in 1970. Figure 9 shows the rapid spread of literacy.
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Figure 8. Composition of Gdp in Mexico
Figure 9. literacy rate, population age 10 and older in Mexico
The private sector pushed for a process of Mexicanization (mexicanización) 
of the economy. Starting in the 1950s, but especially at the beginning 
of the 1960s, businessmen pressured the government to provide them 
with additional protection from foreign competition beyond tariffs. 
Laws and regulations were the instrument. Businessmen were also 
able to set barriers to entry in sectors that were considered strategic. 
The electricity industry was nationalized in 1960. As seen in Figure 6, 
the process of import substitution continued, now by producing 
domestically intermediate goods and capital goods, to make Mexico 
less dependent on foreign technology and on the need of having 
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domestically. Import substitution took place in the chemical and 
petrochemical industries, rubber, plastic, fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, 
soap, detergents, and cosmetics. 
Mexicanization resulted in a loss in the competitiveness of Mexican 
firms. As part of the policy of import substitution, the government 
set direct and indirect subsidies to the industrial sector. The policy 
of import substitution led to a reinforcement of the oligopolistic 
structure of the Mexican economy. The price and quality of goods 
produced were not competitive. Protection of infant industries led to 
protection of inefficiency. 
The government pursued a policy of Mexicanization of production, and 
to create empresas paraestatales, firms run by the government, based 
on the belief that it was better to borrow from abroad than to accept 
foreign direct investment (FDI), as during the Porfiriato. In 1961, a new 
mining law stated that fiscal incentives would be given only to firms in 
which the majority of capital was owned by Mexican nationals. New 
mining concessions would be granted to firms with 66 percent national 
capital. The low production of iron, steel and sulfur led the government 
to invest in their production. In the case of the petrochemical industry, 
the maximum percentage of foreign capital was 40 percent. In 1966 
the financial sector was Mexicanized. In 1970 the government decided 
to Mexicanize the iron and steel industry, cement, glass, cellulose, 
fertilizers, and aluminum. At least 51 percent of capital had to belong 
to nationals. This measure was not retroactive, but existing foreign 
firms that planned to expand their plans or acquire new ones had to be 
authorized by the Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores (Department of 
Foreign Affairs). Additionally, the use of Mexican intermediate goods 
was required in many sectors, in particular in the production of cars, 
trucks and other durable goods. Mexican entrepreneurs were protected 
not only from foreign products, but also from foreign capital.
3.2.  1970-1981: Fiscal imbalances and collapse  
of import substitution
The first half of this period, 1970-1976, was called Desarrollo Compartido 
(Shared Development). The goals of economic policy announced in 1970 
were economic growth and an improvement of income distribution. The 
period known as Desarrollo Estabilizador (Stabilizing Development), 
1958-1970, according to Solís (2000) had been one of growth, but there 
was a new objective: to reduce income inequality.241 Timothy J. Kehoe and Felipe Meza | Catch-up Growth Followed by Stagnation
Between 1970 and 1981, the principal policy instrument was government 
spending. The government incurred deficits that were financed via 
domestic credit from the Banco de México and borrowing from abroad. 
The average yearly growth rate of the medios de pago (M1) was 25.8 
percent between 1970 and 1982. Inflation was on average 18.9 percent 
per year, measured with the GDP deflator. Real GDP per working-age 
person grew at an average rate of 3.5 percent. 
Government intervention in the economy had a negative impact on the 
economy. There was an increase in regulation and bureaucracy that 
discouraged the formation of new firms. The creation of firms managed 
by the government, and the purchase of firms by the government, 
increased the fiscal deficit. These firms represented projects of low 
social benefit. The economy was also hit by external shocks, such as 
the fall in the price of oil in international markets, and the rise in 
international interest rates, before the 1982 debt crisis. 
During the administration of Luís Echeverría (1970-1976), public 
sector deficit as a fraction of GDP went from 2.2 percent in 1970 to 
9.0 percent in 1975. As the government borrowed in international 
markets to finance the public sector deficit, the current account deficit 
went from 1.8 percent of GDP in 1972 to 4.8 percent in 1975. The 
administration of Echeverría ended with a devaluation of the peso 
after 22 years of fixing the exchange rate at 12.50 pesos per dollar. 
During the administration of José López Portillo (1976-1982), the 
discovery of massive oil fields in early 1978 had a significant impact 
on economic policy. According to Cárdenas (1996), proven oil reserves 
increased 151.2 percent between 1977 and 1978. The government 
implemented a program of public investment aimed at the expansion 
of the oil industry. There was also an expansion of public infrastructure 
and of provision of public health and education services. Between 
1978 and 1982, public investment and private investment grew in real 
terms at a yearly rate of 15.0 percent. For the first time in history, the 
demand for elementary school education was fully satisfied. The fraction 
of the population with access to medical services reached 85 percent, 
having been 60 percent in 1976. The government created important 
policy instruments. It implemented the VAT (IVA, Impuesto al Valor 
Agregado, Value-Added Tax). It also created what would become the 
most important government domestic bonds, CETES (Certificados de 
la Tesorería de la Federación).242 LATIN AMERICAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | Vol. 48 No. 2 (Nov., 2011), 227–268
The fall in the price of oil in mid-1981 had a severe negative impact 
on public finances. The public sector deficit relative to GDP had 
reached a level of 10 percent in 1976, although it fell to 7 percent in 
1980. The fall in oil exports in 1981 led to a deficit of 14.7 percent 
in 1981, however, and to 17.6 percent in 1982. At the same time, the 
foreign debt of the public sector went from 4.3 billion U.S. dollars in 
1970 to 58.9 billion in 1982. Finally, in 1982, the Mexican government 
announced that it could not face the scheduled debt payments, thus 
starting the 1982 debt crisis. 
3.3.  1982-1995: Crisis and reform
In 1982, the macroeconomic situation in Mexico was difficult. The 
public sector deficit was 17.6 percent of GDP. The current account 
deficit was 4 percent of GDP. Inflation, measured with the GDP 
deflator, was 61.0 percent between 1981 and 1982. GDP per working-
age person fell 3.2 percent between 1981 and 1982, and 6.0 percent 
between 1982 and 1983. The administration of Miguel de la Madrid 
(1982-1988) responded by setting up an economic program known 
as Programa Inmediato de Reordenación Económica (PIRE), to be 
in place between December 1982 and May 1986. The objectives of 
the program included reducing the growth of public expenditure, 
carrying out public infrastructure projects, and honoring the payments 
of external debt.
In terms of fiscal policy, the government reduced its expenditure, 
modified tax codes to increase tax revenue, increased the prices of 
goods controlled by the government (that is, energy prices such as 
the price of gasoline), and started a process of privatization of firms 
owned by the government (the empresas paraestatales). The process of 
privatization was important. In 1982 there were 1,155 firms owned by 
the government. By 1988 there were 618 of these firms. The privatization 
process would continue during 1988-1994. The nationalization of the 
banking sector was a source of resources for the government. According 
to Aspe (1993), a major source of resources was the encaje legal, which 
represented credit to the public sector at zero cost or at low interest 
rates. In 1986 Mexico signaled its intention to open its markets to 
foreign competition by joining the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT). Inflation was high despite the PIRE. Between 1986 and 
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In December 1987 a new economic program was created, the Pacto 
de Solidaridad Económica (PSE), that had as its main objective the 
reduction of inflation. This program was in effect until late 1988. The 
measures taken by the government included a reduction in the public 
sector deficit, trade openness, and consensus building (concertación). 
The aim of consensus building was to stabilize the price level. The 
government held meetings with labor union leaders (sector obrero), 
peasant leaders (sector campesino), and businessmen. Workers reduced 
their demands for increases in wages, peasants agreed not to increase 
guaranteed prices (precios de garantía) in real terms, and businessmen 
agreed to reduce increases in prices and increase productivity. In turn, 
the public sector agreed to reduce its expenditure and the number of 
firms owned by the government. The public sector deficit went from 
16.1 percent of GDP to 11.7 percent between 1987 and 1988. Inflation 
fell, but it remained at a high level.
In December of 1988, the administration of Carlos Salinas (1988-
1994) created a new program called the Pacto para la Estabilidad y el 
Crecimiento Económico (PECE). The principal goal was to achieve an 
inflation rate of one digit by reaching a consensus with workers and 
businessmen. The public sector balance was actually a surplus in 1991 
and remained a surplus until the end of the Salinas government. The 
program was successful as inflation fell from 141.0 percent in 1987 to 
8.3 percent in 1994.
Many reforms took place during 1988-1994: among them, a continued 
privatization of firms owned by the government, the signing of the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the liberalization of 
the banking sector, and the independence of the central bank, Banco 
de México. The process of regaining access to international financial 
markets, after the 1982 debt crisis, was also undertaken. The number 
of firms owned by the government fell from 618 in 1988 to 252 in 
1994. An important firm privatized in this period was TELMEX, the 
monopoly providing telephone services. 
In May 1990 the government announced its intention to sign a trade 
agreement with the United States. In January 1994 NAFTA, the 
trade and foreign investment agreement with the United States and 
Canada, came into effect. This agreement was the culmination of a 
major liberalization of foreign trade and investment by the Mexican 
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In the financial system, the trend was to reduce its role as a source 
of resources for the government and to allocate credit according to 
market forces. In 1988 the encaje legal, previously mentioned, was 
substituted for an obligation for banks to keep an equivalent of 30 
percent of certain liabilities allocated to government bonds. This 
mechanism was called the coeficiente de liquidez obligatorio. In 1989 it 
was eliminated. In 1991 and 1992, the banking system was privatized. 
In 1993, a constitutional reform, in Article 28, specified the main task 
of the Banco de México as being the protection of the purchasing power 
of the peso and granted the Banco independence from the government. 
This article also stated that no authority could force the Banco de México 
to provide financing. In 1994 the Banco de México Law was enacted, 
specifying the rules under which it would be related to the government. 
The process of debt renegotiation with foreign lenders started in 1989. 
In that year the United States announced the Brady plan. Mexico 
negotiated an agreement with international bankers in July 1989. 
Domestic interest rates fell 20 percentage points in August of that year, 
although they later rose, to levels below those before the negotiation. 
Mexico signed the agreement with foreign lenders in February 1990. 
These years of reforms preceded the 1994-1995 crisis. Kehoe (1995b) 
provides a detailed timeline of the crisis and the events leading up to 
it. During 1994, several political and economic negative events took 
place, in the months before the devaluation of the peso in December. 
The peso-dollar exchange rate had been allowed to fluctuate within 
a predetermined band. The upper bound of this band was widened, 
letting it increase periodically. The government issued a growing amount 
of short-term dollar-indexed debt, the Tesobono debt. It became the 
largest source of short-term borrowing for the government, surpassing 
the amount of short-term peso debt in circulation, the CETES debt.
In the last quarter of 1994, the situation worsened. In late December, 
the government abandoned the fixed exchange rate regime. The peso 
devalued considerably. In early January of 1995, the government was 
unable to roll over the Tesobono debt. The 1994-1995 crisis was a 
liquidity crisis, due to the short maturity and dollar indexation of the 
Tesobono debt: there was a public sector surplus in 1994. Furthermore, 
the ratio of total debt to GDP was not at historical highs. On the other 
hand, the Tesobono debt grew rapidly during 1994. Stocks of other 
kinds of debt remained stagnant, and some decreased. The growth 
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(1996) point out: first, it increased the ratio of dollar-indexed debt to 
international reserves; and, second, it reduced the average maturity 
of government debt. By July 1994, the stock of Tesobonos was larger 
than the international reserves of the Banco de México. At the same 
time, the average maturity of government bonds had fallen from a 
maximum during 1994 of 305.8 days to 277.8 days (Cole and Kehoe 
1996). During the end of December, Mexico abandoned its exchange-
rate regime and let the peso float. At the end of December 1994, the 
stock of Tesobonos was much bigger than international reserves, and 
maturity had fallen to 205.7 days.
One important consequence of the crisis was its negative impact on 
the banking system. During 1988-1994 there was a large increase 
in the ratio of bank credit to GDP, as seen in Figure 5. The rise 
in interest rates implied a large debt burden on consumers and on 
firms. There was a rise in past due loan payments. The government 
took the decision of rescuing the banking sector. Initially, this rescue 
was carried out through the Fondo Bancario de Protección al Ahorro 
(FOBAPROA), a deposit insurance public institution created in the 
previous administration. Solís (2000) estimates the cost of this rescue 
at 15 percent of GDP.
The financial crisis of 1994-1995 had a large negative impact on 
economic activity. Real GDP per working-age person fell 8.4 percent 
in 1995. Growth accounting indicates that most of this fall in 
GDP per working-age person was due to a large fall in total factor 
productivity (TFP). That TFP fell by a large amount is robust to 
measuring it assuming variable capital utilization. Meza and Quintin 
(2007) report that capital utilization can account for only one-third 
of the drops in TFP in past crises in Argentina and Southeast Asia 
and the 1994-1995 crisis in Mexico. This is a reminder that theories 
that want to explain the economic performance of Mexico have to 
be able to account for large falls in TFP, as well as an overall lack 
of growth in TFP outside crisis periods.
3.4.  1995-2007: recovery and slow growth
Two important features of the 1995-2007 period are the rapid growth 
after the crisis that started in December 1994, and the fact that the 
economy grew on average at the same rate as did the United States: 
real GDP per working-age person grew at an average annual rate of 
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Fiscal and monetary policies after the crisis were procyclical. The 
administration of Ernesto Zedillo, in office between 1994 and 2000, 
responded to the crisis with measures of fiscal austerity. The effects 
of these measures on economic activity are studied in Meza (2008). In 
January 1995, U.S. president Bill Clinton put together a financial aid 
package that allowed Mexico to keep access to international financial 
markets. Ramos-Francia and Torres-García (2005) argue that the 
objectives of monetary policy were to reduce inflationary pressures 
and to prevent a situation of fiscal dominance. 
The Zedillo administration made major reforms to the banking sector. 
(See, for example, Haber 2009.) The government limited loans to 
related parties, required banks to use accounting practices closer to 
those in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), put limits on deposit insurance, allowed foreign banks to 
purchase Mexican banks, and created reserve minimums that depend 
on the risk of a bank’s portfolio. To our knowledge, there is no study 
that analyzes the impact of these reforms on the amount of credit in 
the economy, but Figure 5 indicates that they cannot have been large. 
In 2000 Vicente Fox became president (2000-2006). As the candidate 
of the Partido Acción Nacional (PAN), the right-wing party, Fox was 
the first opposition-party president after 71 years of rule by the PRI. 
During his term, the average growth rate of real GDP per working-
age person slowed down, to an annual average of 0.7 percent per 
year. This low average is partly due to the negative growth of −1.7 
percent registered between 2000 and 2001, which coincided with the 
2001 recession in the United States.
The Fox administration undertook reforms aimed at fostering credit in 
the economy. (See Haber 2009.) In 2001, it carried out a bankruptcy 
reform. The change was to avoid the bankruptcy courts by permitting 
banks and borrowers to write contracts that put collateralized assets 
outside of the borrower’s bankruptcy estate. Those assets are assigned 
to the lender. Another reform had to do with the mortgage market. 
Liens on property were substituted by trusts in which the bank is at 
the same time the trustee and the beneficiary of the trust. If a borrower 
does not pay, the bank can evict her and sell the house in an auction. 
A third change aimed at fostering credit had to do with digitalizing 
property registers, in a pilot program in some northern states. This 
reform was aimed at providing more information to creditors, given 
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land actually has title to it. Finally, the Fox government allowed the 
entry of more participants into the banking industry, granting a bank 
charter to six retailers. Once again, the data in Figure 5 indicate that 
these reforms did little to expand private credit.
The post-1995 macroeconomic situation of Mexico showed continuous 
improvement. Yearly inflation, measured with the consumer price index 
(CPI), fell to a one-digit level in 2000. It had a level of 3.8 percent 
in 2007. Nominal interest rates have also fallen over time. At the end 
of 2000, the interest rate on a 28-day CETE was 17.05 percent. By 
2007 it was 7.44 percent.
3.5.  2007-2010: Great recession
In the period 2007-2009, the Mexican economy suffered the impact 
of the international financial crisis. The fall in economic activity was 
much larger in Mexico than in other Latin American countries. One 
reason for the bigger contraction is that the Mexican manufacturing 
sector is highly synchronized with the economy of the United States.   
In contrast to previous episodes, the administration of Felipe Calderón, 
who is the second president from the PAN and whose term is 2006–2012, 
implemented fiscal measures that were in part countercyclical.     The 
central bank lowered interest rates. As of the end of 2010, the Mexican 
economy had made progress recovering from the crisis.
Table 1 reports the behavior of the largest Latin American economies 
and the United States between 2008 and 2009 using data on GDP 
per working-age person in constant 2005 international dollars. We 
calculate the percentage change in GDP per working-age person, 
and the percentage deviation from the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) trend 
in 2009. We use data from 1980 to 2010. Mexico had the largest fall 
in GDP per working-age person, 7.7 percent. The country with the 
second largest fall is Venezuela, 5.1 percent. The United States had 
the third largest fall, 3.3 percent. Other Latin American countries had 
smaller contractions, and one of them even shows positive growth. For 
Mexico this fall in GDP was slightly smaller than the one registered 
between 1994 and 1995, which was 8.4 percent. Mexico also displays 
the largest percentage fall below its HP trend, 5.2 percent. The United 
States had the second largest fall, 3.6 percent. Other Latin American 
countries had smaller falls below trend, and some of them were above 
trend. For Mexico this fall below was slightly smaller than the one 
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table 1.  latin american and the united States  
during the Great recession
(Percent)
Change 2008-2009 in Gdp 
per working-age person











Sources: World Bank World Development Indicators and authors’ calculations.
One of the possible reasons behind the large contraction in Mexico is 
the synchronization between manufacturing activity in Mexico and in 
the United States. Chiquiar and Ramos-Francia (2005) find that the 
correlation between the Mexican and United States manufacturing 
sectors increased after NAFTA. Looking at data on real value added 
by industry for the United States, we see that manufacturing fell 
approximately 9 percent between 2008 and 2009. The large fall in 
manufacturing in the United States can account for part of the 
contraction in manufacturing, and therefore for part of the overall 
fall in GDP in Mexico. 
Public policy in response to the crisis was in part countercyclical. This 
is an important change compared to previous crises. In response to 
both the 1982 debt crisis and the 1994-1995 crisis, the government 
implemented fiscal austerity. From 2000 to 2008, the public sector 
deficit fell from 1 percent of GDP to approximately zero.3 In 2009 the 
deficit rose to slightly more than 2 percent of GDP. The source of this 
increase in the deficit was a change in accounting rules. According to 
Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público (2010) in October 2008, the 
3.  The term “Public Sector” includes both the Federal Government and Institutions and Firms under 
Direct Budgetary Control (IFDBC). These IFDBC include PEMEX, the national oil company. The 
statistics related to the Public Sector exclude nonfinancial institutions and firms classified as under 
Indirect Budgetary Control (IFIBC). These statistics also exclude financial institutions controlled by the 
government, categorized as financial IFIBC, which are principally the development banks.249 Timothy J. Kehoe and Felipe Meza | Catch-up Growth Followed by Stagnation
law that rules the accounting of PEMEX, the national oil company, 
was modified so that certain investments made by PEMEX, called 
PIDIREGAS (Proyectos de Inversión Diferida en el Registro del Gasto, 
Investment Projects with Deferred Expenditure Registration), which 
were not previously registered in the public deficit, would be recorded 
in it starting in 2009. If this investment by PEMEX is excluded from 
the deficit, the deficit-GDP ratio is approximately zero in 2009. 
In terms of changes in taxation, the government implemented some 
procyclical measures in 2010. The government raised certain tax 
rates and created new taxes. On the other hand, for 2010, according 
to Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público (2010), there would be 
a deficit-GDP ratio of 2.7 percent considering investment made by 
PEMEX including PIDIREGAS, and 0.7 percent excluding it. The 
government said that the increase from approximately zero in 2009 
to 0.7 percent in 2010 was part of the countercyclical measures in 
response to the current international financial crisis. 
Monetary policy during the Great Recession was countercyclical. The 
Banco de México reduced its target interest rate starting in January 
2009. The target fell from 8.25 percent at the end of 2008 to 4.5 percent 
in July 2009. (See Banco de México 2009a, 2009b.) The interest rate 
remained at that level during 2010. 
During 2010, the Mexican economy recovered partially from the crisis. 
Real GDP per working-age person increased 3.2 percent. It still had 
not recovered its pre-crisis level, however. A question of obvious 
importance is whether Mexico will grow at a higher rate than in the 
past after the crisis is over, or if it will continue to display stagnation, 
conditional on a possible new global recession.
4.  the power of productivity
In this section, we analyze the performance of the Mexican economy 
during 1950-2010 using the one-sector neoclassical model. We argue 
that to understand the evolution of real GDP, we need to understand 
the evolution of TFP. In the next section, we propose an extension of 
the model to analyze the evolution of TFP in Mexico during 1950-2010. 
The model has the aggregate production function
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Here, Kt is the capital stock in period t, Lt hours worked, Ct aggregate 
consumption, and It aggregate investment. We subsume government 
consumption into Ct and government investment into It. The parameter 
At is TFP. The capital stock depreciates geometrically,
Kt +1 = Kt - dKt + It  (2)
The stand-in household has the utility function
β γ γ
t





    (3)
Here Nt is the working-age population and h is the maximum amount 
of hours available for work per person. The household’s budget 
constraint is 
C K K w L r K T t t t t t t t t t + − = + − − + +1 1 ( )( ) τ δ   (4)
Here the wage rate wt and the rental rate rt  are compatible with profit 
maximization by competitive firms with the production function (1):
w A K L t t t t =
− − a
a a 1 1   (5)
r A K L t t t t = −
− ( ) . 1 a
a a   (6)
There is a tax on capital income with a tax rate tt and tax revenues
T r K t t t t = − τ δ ( ) ,   (7)
which are redistributed in a lump-sum form to the household.
Suppose that both TFP and the working-age population grow at 
constant rates, At = gtA0 and Nt = htN0. Then this economy has a 
unique balanced-growth path in which all the quantities per working-
age person grow by the factor g = g1 /(1 - a), with the exception of 
market hours per working-age person Lt/Nt, which are constant. It 
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and Prescott (2002, 2007). This growth accounting rearranges terms 
in the production function to decompose the determinants of output 
into three factors. The advantage of this decomposition is that each 
of the three factors leads us to examine a different set of shocks and 


















   












In this growth accounting, growth in human capital shows up as 
growth in TFP. Fluctuations in factor utilization also show up as 
fluctuations in TFP, although this is probably more important in 
studying business cycle moments, like the 1994-1995 financial crisis 
in Mexico, than it is in studying growth over a decade or longer. 
The growth accounting in Equation (8), in contrast to that of 
Solow (1957) and Denison (1962), takes into account the feature of 
the neoclassical growth model that, in a balanced-growth path, as 
technological growth occurs, households save so as to keep the capital-
output ratio constant. Researchers like De Gregorio and Lee (2004) 
and Bosworth and Collins (2008), who use a growth accounting that 
looks at increases in output per worker as a function of variables 
that include capital per worker, typically find increases in TFP and 
increases in capital roughly equally important in accounting for 
growth. Our growth accounting—which imputes to the productivity 
factor the increase in capital necessary to keep the capital-output 
ratio constant and imputes to the capital factor only the increases 
in the capital-output ratio, that is, capital deepening—finds that 
capital is much less important and that increases in productivity 
are typically the driving force of economic growth.
Figure 10 presents this growth accounting for the United States over 
the period 1950-2010, where we follow Bergoeing et al. (2002, 2007) in 
setting the capital share a = 0.30. (All of the data used in this growth 
accounting exercise and details on how we have processed these data 
are available at www.umn.edu/~tkehoe.) Notice that theses data are 
close to those of a balanced-growth path in that the capital factor 
(Kt/Yt)a/(1 - a) and the labor factor Lt/Nt are close to being constant, 
and growth in real GNP per working-age person Yt/Nt is driven by 
growth in the productivity factor At
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Figure 10. Growth accounting for the united States
Figure 11. Growth accounting for Mexico
Figure 11 presents the growth accounting for Mexico over the period 
1950-2010. The picture changes radically. The data are close to a 
balanced-growth path over 1950-1970. The growth of the productivity 
factor slows down over 1970-1981, even as in labor and capital factors 
increase. After 1981, the picture changes radically. Output per person, 
TFP, and hours fall sharply. 
The calibration of the parameters of the model and the computation 
of its equilibrium follow Bergoeing et al. (2002, 2007). To estimate the 
consumption weight g, we use the intratemporal first-order condition 
from the household’s utility maximization problem,253 Timothy J. Kehoe and Felipe Meza | Catch-up Growth Followed by Stagnation
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We set h equal to 100 hours per week and average over 1950-1960 
data to estimate g = 0.257. To calibrate the tax rate, we use the 
intertemporal first-order condition from the household’s utility 
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We set b = 0.980 and average over 1950-1960 data to estimate 
t = 0.509. We have included a tax on capital in the model because 
Bergoeing et al. (2002, 2007) argue that fiscal reforms in Mexico in 
the late 1980s play a major role in determining capital accumulation 
there. We will also run a numerical experiment where we set tt = 0.509 
for t = 1950, 1951,..., 1987 but have tt unexpectedly change to 0.254 
in 1988 and afterwards. 
Ideally, we would calibrate the parameters g and t to data from 
before 1950 so that we could avoid fitting consumption-savings and 
consumption-leisure decisions in the model to the period in which 
we are interested. Unfortunately, we do not have enough data from 
before 1950 to do this. We calibrate the model to 1950-1960 data, and, 
assuming that the capital-output ratio in 1950 is equal to its average 
over 1950-1960, we calculate an initial capital stock K1950. Since we 
calibrate the parameters of the model to 1950-1960 data, we should 
not be surprised to see the model fit the data well for this period. The 
test of the model is how well it does for 1960-2010.
Given the calibrated model, we can perform numerical experiments. In 
the first experiment, we start the model in T0 = 1950 with the initial 
value of the capital stock K1950. We set the values for the TFP series 
A1950, A1951,..., equal to the observed values over the period 1950-2010 
and let At grow at the rate of 1.40 percent per year after that, which 
corresponds to a balanced-growth rate in output per working-age 
person of 2 percent per year, 1.0140 = 1.021 - a = 1.020.7. We also set 
the values for the working-age population N1950, N1951,...  equal to 
the observed values over the period 1950-2010 and let Nt grow at the 
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was the observed growth rate of the working-age population in 2010. 
All of the other variables are computed endogenously. 
Figure 12 presents the results for real GDP per working-age person 
in Mexico. (The model produces results for all variables of interest, 
including Kt/Yt and Lt/Nt.) Notice that the model does an excellent job 
of explaining the behavior of Yt/Nt  over 1950-1981, although the fit for 
1950-1960 should come as no surprise given our calibration procedure. 
Afterwards, the model produces a path for Yt/Nt that is substantially 
worse than that observed in the data. How do we interpret the results 
of the experiment without a tax reform? Given the observed values of 
At and Nt , the behavior of endogenous variables like Yt is very close 
to that in the data for 1950-1981. The behavior of other variables, like 
Ct, It, Lt, and Kt, is also very close, although we do not present all of 
the graphs. It is At, rather than Nt, that is important in driving our 
results. In other words, given the performance of TFP, the evolution 
of the Mexican economy over 1950-1981 is very close to being what 
the model would predict. The results also indicate that, had nothing 
else besides observed productivity and population changed after 1982, 
the Mexican economy would have done far worse than it actually did.
Figure 12. real Gdp per working-age person in Mexico
Bergoeing et al. (2002, 2007) argue that in the late 1980s a series of 
fiscal reforms in Mexico changed the incentives to accumulate capital. 
To capture the impact of these reforms we run another numerical 
experiment, identical to the first except that in 1988 we change tt 
from 0.509 to 0.254 and leave it at this level. We model this change 255 Timothy J. Kehoe and Felipe Meza | Catch-up Growth Followed by Stagnation
as unexpected by households. The model now does much better in 
tracking the performance of the Mexican economy over 1982-2010. 
Our conclusion is that, if we take into account a major change in 
incentives to accumulate capital in the 1980s and if we can understand 
the evolution of TFP in Mexico, we understand most of the evolution 
of the Mexican macroeconomy over 1950-2010.
It is worth noting that this model can be modified to include foreign 
trade and investment, as in Kehoe and Ruhl (2009). This modification, 
especially the modeling of the inflow of foreign investment in the early 
1990s and its sudden stop in 1995-1996, can improve the performance 
of the model even further.
Many other authors, going back to the late 1950s, have realized that 
understanding TFP growth is essential for understanding economic 
growth. Of particular relevance for the theoretical framework that 
we sketch out in the next section are Lewis (2004) and Parente and 
Prescott (1994, 2002). Lewis (2004) uses case studies of different 
countries to show that productivity in other sectors, besides just 
manufacturing, is essential for determining relative income levels 
across countries. He also uses anecdotal evidence to argue that it 
is government policies that discourage the adoption of the best 
available technologies from the rest of the world that keeps countries 
relatively poor. Parente and Prescott (1994, 2002) develop a model 
in which it is government policies and institutions like monopolies 
that impede new technology adoption that keep productivity, and 
therefore income per capital, low. 
This growth-retarding impact of monopolies is especially relevant for 
Mexico, where, in the early 1990s, the privatization of large empresas 
paraestatales in nonmanufacturing sectors granted monopoly rights 
to the purchasers of these firms. Although this privatization policy 
maximized the revenues accrued from privatization, it resulted in 
inefficient monopolies in telecommunications and transportation.
5.  theoretical framework
In this section, we use the theoretical framework developed by Kehoe 
and Ruhl (2010) to analyze Mexico’s growth experience. In the next 
section, we use this framework to compare Mexico’s experience with 
that of China. Kehoe and Ruhl (2010) follow Kehoe and Prescott 
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over the past century or more as the starting point for our theory. 
Let us focus again on the data on economic growth in the United 
States in Figure 2. Notice how close these data are to a constant 
growth path with 2 percent growth per year. The average growth rate 
during this period was 1.91 percent per year. (It was 1.97 percent 
per year over 1875-2007.) Kehoe and Prescott hypothesize that the 
near-constant growth in the United States is driven by near-constant 
growth in the stock of knowledge useful in production. It should be 
stressed that this stock of knowledge is not measured TFP. Measured 
TFP depends on the stock of knowledge but also depends on the 
efficiency with which factors of production are allocated across firms 
and sectors in the economy. 
The data on growth in the United States presented in Figure 2 are 
fascinating and invite speculation and theorizing. It is difficult, for 
example, to reconcile them with the once-popular endogenous growth 
theories of researchers like Romer (1986). As we have mentioned, the 
United Kingdom was the industrial leader during the 19th century, and 
it is possible that the European Union or even China might assume 
that role later in the 21st century. Lucas (2009), for example, develops 
a model of the development of new ideas that he parameterizes to 
yield a growth rate of 2 percent per year. This model might be useful 
in thinking about how this long-run growth rate might change. It 
is possible, for example, that technological progress may be slowly 
accelerating: as we have mentioned, according to Maddison (1995), 
in the United Kingdom the average growth of real GDP per capita 
1820-1900 was 1.2 percent per year. While all of this is interesting, it 
is mostly relevant for countries at the technological frontier, countries 
like the United States, Canada, and Japan and countries in Western 
Europe where what Lewis (2004) calls “best practice” is developed. 
It is largely irrelevant to our question involving growth in Mexico, a 
country that is behind the industrial leader and simply needs to adapt 
best practice from elsewhere. Kehoe and Ruhl (2010) hypothesize 
that the stock of knowledge, which has increased very smoothly over 
the past century or more, can be adopted, perhaps at some cost by 
countries that are behind the industrial leader. This would give rise 
to trend growth of close to 2 percent per year, at least after capital 
and labor have had time to adjust. In this framework, changes in 
policies—such as the development of railroads during the Porfiriato 
and of the policies to promote urbanization, industrialization, and 
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Depression and the import substitution period that followed—affect 
only the levels of a balanced-growth path. Long-run growth remains 
at 2 percent per year. The absolute level that a specific country is 
at compared to the industrial leader depends on its institutions and 
economic policies. Changes in these institutions and economic policies 
can cause depressions or booms. Eventually, however, if institutions 
and policies stabilize, and after capital and labor have adjusted, the 
country returns to trend growth. 
How do we interpret the economic history of Mexico in terms of 
this theory? Changes in economic policies during the Porfiriato and 
the recovery from the Revolución and the Great Depression led to 
catch-up growth. Policy mistakes made during the end of the import 
substitution period 1970-1981 led to the crises that followed. After 
1995, we interpret Mexico as being in the balanced-growth path that 
its policies and institutions warrant. 
What are the factors that impede Mexico from continuing catch-up 
growth and reaching levels of income like that in its neighbors and 
trade partners, Canada and the United States? A number of researchers 
have addressed this question and conclude that Mexico’s slow growth, 
despite its reforms over 1985-1995, is a consequence of its inefficient 
financial system and lack of contract enforcement. Bergoeing et al. 
(2002, 2007) compare the growth trajectories of Chile and Mexico 
following the financial crises they both suffered in the 1980s; Chile 
recovered rapidly while Mexico stagnated. They conclude that the 
crucial differences between policies in Mexico and Chile are those 
related to the banking system and to bankruptcy proceedings. Krueger 
and Tornell (1999) and Tornell et al. (2003) also find that the lack of 
credit, particularly in the nontradable goods sector, was responsible 
for the poor growth in Mexico. The data in Figure 4 show the very 
low levels of credit that the Mexican financial sector provides the 
private sector. In 1950-1981 the economy was able to grow in spite 
of the inefficient financial sector because the government did much of 
the investment. One indicator of the problems in contract enforcement 
in Mexico, besides anecdotal evidence, is precisely this low level of 
credit. Another indicator is the data from the World Bank’s Doing 
Business on the costs of recovering damages from a broken contract 
presented in Table 2. Another barrier to growth in Mexico is the rigid 
labor market. Kambourov (2009), for example, presents evidence for 
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much from opening to trade as Chile did. The last column in Table 2 
presents data collected by Heckman and Pagés (2000) on the costs 
of job security regulation, another measure of labor market rigidity.4 
table 2.  indicators of Contract enforcement  
and labor Market rigidities





Canada 570 22.3 36 0.55
Chile 480 28.6 36 3.38
Mexico 415 32.0 38 3.13
United States 300 14.4 32 0.00
Sources: World Bank Doing Business and Heckman and Pagés (2000).
There are other barriers to growth in Mexico. We have already discussed 
the monopolies in electricity, telecommunications, transportation, and 
petroleum extraction. In recent years, violence associated with drug 
trafficking has also been a barrier to growth.
6.  Mexico versus China
China is another large, less-developed country that has opened itself to 
foreign trade and investment, and to which Mexico is often compared. 
Growth in recent years in China has been spectacular. As the data 
in Figures 13, 14, and 15 show, the same forces that drove rapid 
growth in Mexico during 1950-1981 have been at play more recently 
in China: urbanization, industrialization, and education. Notice that 
in Figure 13 China is still substantially behind Mexico in terms of 
urbanization and that in Figure 14 it is still substantially behind 
in terms of industrialization.5 It is only in the data on education in 
Figure 15 where China is ahead of Mexico.
4.  Notice that Chile does not do much better than Mexico in the data presented in Table 2. This is 
an indication of where to look for barriers to growth in Chile to account for its slow growth since 1998.
5.  The data in Figure 13 are not strictly comparable to those in Figure 7, but they are close. The 
definition of urban population has changed a number of times in the Chinese census, but up until 1982 
the urban population was that living in cities and towns, where towns were defined as either settlements 
with more than 3,000 inhabitants of whom more than 70 percent were registered as nonagricultural or 
settlements with a population ranging from 2,500 to 3,000 inhabitants of whom more than 85 percent 
were registered as nonagricultural. 259 Timothy J. Kehoe and Felipe Meza | Catch-up Growth Followed by Stagnation
Figure 13. urban population in China
Figure 14. Composition of Gdp in China
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China’s recent economic development differs in an important aspect 
from that in Mexico during 1950-1981: as the data in Figures 16 and 
17 show, China has opened itself to foreign trade and investment in a 
way comparable to that in Mexico in the 1990s, much later than 1950-
1981. Spectacular Chinese growth as it has opened provides evidence 
that Mexico would have grown even faster during 1950-1981 if it had 
opened itself then. During its import substitution period, Mexico paid 
for very expensive domestically produced intermediate goods and capital 
goods, while China imports these sorts of goods cheaply from abroad. 
(See, for example, Dean, Fung, and Wang 2007.) Xu (2011), following 
Jones (2011), develops a model of structural change and growth in 
China 1991-2004 in which imports of intermediate goods into the 
manufacturing sector play an important role. He finds that China’s 
opening to foreign trade—which allows it to import primary goods and 
intermediate goods and to export final manufactured goods—accounts 
for most of China’s growth over the period. Grobovšek (2011) presents 
evidence that inefficiencies among producers of intermediate goods 
is one of the principal determinants of low TFP in less-developed 
countries and that importing intermediate goods is a way to escape 
this problem. Connolly and Yi (2009) argue that a similar strategy 
of importing intermediate goods and exporting final manufactured 
goods played a major role in South Korea’s growth miracle. Mexico’s 
import substitution policies prevented it from doing this and forced 
it to keep resources locked up producing goods where it did not have 
the comparative advantage.
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Figure 17. Foreign direct investment in China and Mexico
Identifying an inefficient financial system and lack of contract enforcement 
as the factors that retard Mexican growth generates a puzzle because 
China also suffers from these problems. China has been able to grow 
with a poorly functioning financial and legal system, despite the lack 
of significant reforms to these systems (Rawski 1994, Allen, Qian, and 
Qian 2005). Studying the Chinese experience, Guariglia and Poncet 
(2008) go so far as to question whether an efficient financial system 
is necessary for growth.
What factors have driven growth in China, and are these factors present 
in Mexico? Studies of China’s output growth, such as Brandt and Zhu 
(2009) and Hsieh and Klenow (2009), conclude that productivity growth 
arising from the reallocation of resources across firms is key. It would be 
tempting to hypothesize that the mechanisms that generated productivity 
growth in manufacturing in China were not present in Mexico, but 
López-Córdova (2003) finds that trade and foreign investment reforms 
resulted in large increases in productivity in the manufacturing sector 
in Mexico, especially in those sectors most exposed to foreign trade. 
This suggests that the problem in Mexico is not a lack of productivity 
growth in manufacturing, but in the rest of the economy.
Our solution to the puzzle of why China has grown rapidly and why 
Mexico has not is that China is still at a lower level of development 
than Mexico and the barriers to growth in Mexico—especially the 
inefficient financial system and lack of contract enforcement—have not 
yet affected China. Some evidence for this hypothesis is the comparison 
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see that China still has a far larger fraction of its population living 
in rural areas than does Mexico and that its economy still depends 
far more on agriculture. More direct evidence comes from comparing 
income levels. To compare China with Mexico in terms of absolute 
level of income, we use the purchasing power parity (PPP) real GDP 
data published by the World Bank (2008, 2011). Figure 18 depicts 
the data. China has been growing more rapidly than Mexico, but it 
is still substantially poorer in 2010. Specifically, China’s GDP per 
working-age person in 2010 is 9,410 2005 U.S. dollars, which is only 
48.6 percent of Mexico’s 19,360 dollars. In terms of our theoretical 
framework, Mexico is not experiencing the rapid catch-up growth that 
China is experiencing now because it already had this sort of catch-up 
during the period 1950-1981. 
Figure 18. purchasing power parity Gdp per working-age 
person in China and Mexico
In the theory that we propose, it is easier to grow faster than the 
industrial leader when an economy is far behind. An economy like 
China—or Mexico in 1950-1981—can grow rapidly even with an 
inefficient financial system, lack of contract enforcement, and rigidities 
in the labor market. As the country gets closer to the industrial leader, 
however, rapid growth stops and the country levels off at the trend 
growth rate of GDP per working-age person of 2 percent per year or a 
little less. This seems to have occurred in Western Europe in the early 
1970s, in Japan in the early 1990s, and in Chile in the late 1990s, to 
mention a few cases. How far short of the industrial leader the country 
levels off depends on its institutions and economic policies. Chile, for 263 Timothy J. Kehoe and Felipe Meza | Catch-up Growth Followed by Stagnation
example, after spectacular growth following its great depression in 
the early 1980s, has had a level of real GDP per working-age person 
and a growth rate similar to those in Mexico since about 1998. Unless 
China continues to reform, we can expect economic growth there to 
slow down sharply at some point. It is an open question whether or 
not this slowdown will occur when China is still behind Mexico in 
terms of real GDP per working-age person.6
7.  outlook for the future
Many open questions remain to be resolved for our theory to be 
useful in accounting for the economic development of countries 
like Mexico and China: In general, is openness to trade and foreign 
investment necessary for rapid growth when a country is very far 
behind the industrial leader? India’s recent experience along with 
Mexico’s experience 1950-1981 suggest not. Specific questions about 
the experience of Mexico remain to be resolved as well: Why was 
the period of rapid growth, 1995-2000, following the enactment of 
NAFTA so short? Or, put another way, why was the recovery following 
the 1982-1995 great depression so modest? It may be that Mexico’s 
slower growth since 2000 is the product of the contraction of the U.S. 
manufacturing sector and of competition with China. Perhaps most 
importantly, what sorts of reforms does Mexico need to enact to resume 
rapid catch-up growth? We hypothesize that these are reforms that 
eliminate the barriers to growth of an inefficient financial system, lack 
of contract enforcement, and rigidities in the labor market. In terms 
of more specific reforms, promoting competition in nonmanufacturing 
sectors like electricity, telecommunications, and transportation would 
spur productivity growth. So would allowing private investment in 
petroleum extraction. Reducing violence related to drug trafficking 
would also have a positive impact.
Our analysis also points to directions for future research. We could 
expand the one-sector growth model discussed in Sections 4 and 5 to a 
6.  Our theory suggests that it may be more fruitful to compare Mexico to economies at a similar 
level of economic development. Brazil is a frequently cited example. It is a country that has about 80 
percent of the real GDP per working-age person of Mexico in 2010 but that has experienced higher 
rates of growth than Mexico since 2000. Over the period 1995–2007, however, the growth rate of GDP 
per working age person in Brazil has been 1.1 percent per year, less than Mexico’s 1.7 percent per year. 
Despite high growth in 2009 and 2010, it has yet to be seen whether Brazil is performing significantly 
better than Mexico.264 LATIN AMERICAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | Vol. 48 No. 2 (Nov., 2011), 227–268
model like those in Buera and Kaboski (forthcoming) and Echevarria 
(1997, 2008) with primary, manufacturing, and service sectors. 
The analysis in Xu (2011) indicates that it would also be useful to 
disaggregate manufacturing into intermediate goods and final goods. 
With such a model, we could quantify more precisely the costs and 
benefits of import substitution during the period of Mexico’s fast 
growth 1950-1981. With such a model, we could also extend the theory 
of barriers to growth and transitions to higher balanced-growth paths 
sketched out in Section 5 to incorporate the stages of growth studied 
by Rostow (1960).265 Timothy J. Kehoe and Felipe Meza | Catch-up Growth Followed by Stagnation
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